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Abstract: The smart meters in electricity grids enable fine-grained consumption monitoring. Thus,
suppliers could adjust their tariffs. However, as smart meters are deployed within the smart grid
field, authentication and key establishment between smart grid parties (smart meters, aggregators,
and servers) become an urgency. Besides, as privacy is becoming a big concern for smart meters,
smart grid parties are reluctant to leak their real identities during the authentication phase. In this
paper, we analyze the recent authentication schemes in smart grids and other applied fields, and
propose an anonymous authentication and key establishment scheme between smart grid parties:
FAuth. The proposed scheme is based on bilinear maps and the computational Diffie–Hellman
problem. We changed the way the smart meter parties registered at Key Generation Center, making
the proposed scheme robust against various potential attacks that could be launched by the Key
Generation Center, as the scheme could avoid the private key of the smart meter parties from
leaking to the Key Generation Center. Besides, the proposed scheme reduced the computational
load, both at the smart meter side and at the aggregator side, which make it perfectly suitable for
computation-constrained devices. Security proof results show the proposed scheme is secure under
the BAN logic and random oracle model.
Keywords: anonymous authentication; key establishment; partial key; smart grid; privacy;
bilinear map
1. Introduction
The internet of things is now applied into many parts of our daily life. Smart meters are one of
these. The European Commission has formulated the goal to provide 80% of all households with smart
electricity meters by the year 2020 [1]. As a smart meter can report its measurements periodically
to the utility supplier instantaneously, the utility supplier can dynamically change the supplement
according to the reported data. With more and more smart meters applied, authentication and key
establishment have become an important issue in the smart grid area. According to Sanjab et al.
(2016) [2], “a robust authentication protocol is needed while communicating between smart grid
parties.” According to the Report on Workshop on Security & Privacy in IoT of Europe (2016) [3],
“identification and authentication of end-devices, gateways and servers as very first requirement.”
is considered to help manage scalability, evolutivity and risk assessment of the overall IoT system.
Authentication enables the parties in the smart grid to authenticate each other and establish a shared
key. But as privacy becomes a concern, people start trying to find ways that smart grid parties could
authenticate each other without leaking their identity to adversaries.
First, as a smart meter is installed beside the house of inhabitants, as stated in [4], “this malicious
attacker might be able to forge sensed data such as the amount of electricity usage at this house
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before sending these forged data back to the corresponding service server.” Passive attacks are easily
launched by an attacker, such as eavesdrop attack, and some other attacks launched by the attackers.
Authentication and encryption methods should be applied in this scenario.
Second, electricity usage naturally includes personal information of the inhabitants, according to
the electricity consumption, it is easy to judge if inhabitants are at home or not, and with fine-grained
electricity consumption reporting instantly, privacy-sensitive information, regarding which appliances
are active, can be obtained. Also, by data mining or static methods, according to the electricity
consumption, the status and income of the inhabitants may be revealed, so anonymous authentication
is needed; in FAuth, the identity of the smart meter is encrypted before sending.
Third, as smart meters have constrained computability compared to aggregators, it is necessary to
try to lower the computation cost at the smart meter side; in FAuth, the computation cost at the smart
meter side is the lowest compared to other schemes.
So, in this paper, we proposed an anonymous authentication scheme based on bilinear maps and
the computational Diffie–Hellman problem: FAuth, which totally meets the above three requirements
as stated. The contributions of this paper include the following three points:
1. We changed the way smart meter parties register at the Key Generation Center, detailed in
Section 6.3, and prevent the Key Generation Center from knowing the private key of the smart
grid parties. Thus, some security problems are prevented, detailed in Section 8.
2. Based on the methods of Tsai-Lo [4] and Odelu [5], we proposed FAuth, and the comparison
results show that the proposed scheme greatly reduced the computation costs of smart grid
parties at the authentication phase.
3. Security analyses of BAN logic and random oracle model are conducted to show that the proposed
scheme is safe.
This paper is organized as follows: We discuss the related works in Section 2. Some preliminary
knowledge is described in Section 3. A review of Odelu’s scheme is presented in Section 4. The security
limitations of Odelu’s scheme are discussed at Section 5. The scheme: FAuth is proposed in
Section 6. We conduct two separate security analyses using BAN logic and random oracle model in
Sections 7 and 8. We provide a comparison with the related schemes in Section 9. A brief introduction
of the I3RES Project is given in Section 10. We conclude the paper with a summary of the contributions
in Section 11.
2. Related Work
Tsai-Lo and Nai-Wei Lo proposed an authentication scheme based on bilinear map, and the
computational Diffie–Hellman problem [4]. The advantage of their scheme is that a smart meter
can be quickly authenticated without involving the trust anchor because of the two identity based
cryptosystems. Odelu et al. (2016) provide a scheme with security functionalities, including strong
credentials’ privacy and SK-security under the CK-adversary model [5]. Their scheme provided a
variety of security functionalities, and reduced computational costs for both the smart meter and
service provider. Xia and Wang proposed a key distribution scheme for smart grid network [6].
They used a trusted third party which can conduct key revocation, and the third party can be easily
duplicated in case power outages occur. Jo et al. (2016) proposed efficient and privacy-preserving
protocols for a smart grid in [7]. The proposed protocols were shown to be robust against attacks of
data collection unit (DCU) compromise attacks. Further, in their protocol, the response of messages
were more efficient by the adoption of the distributed verification method.
Zhang et al. (2017) proposed a new, efficient, certificate-less, generalized signcryption (CLGSC)
scheme, and a lightweight and robust security-aware (LRSA) D2D-assist data transmission protocol that
was proposed based on CLGSC [8]. Their security analysis demonstrated that the LRSA protocol can
achieve data confidentiality and integrity, mutual authentication, contextual privacy, anonymity, and so
on. Their experimental results show that the LRSA protocol outperforms the existing schemes in terms
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of computational and communication overhead. Liu et al. (2014) proposed a certificate-less signature
scheme based on bilinear pairings [9]. And based on this scheme, they proposed two certificate-less
remote anonymous schemes for wireless body area networks. A client could anonymously be
authenticated and establish a key with the application provider. He et al. (2016) provided an
improved scheme where the application provider does not have to store any information for the
authenticating users [10]. Li et al. (2013) also proposed an authentication scheme based on bilinear
pairings [11]. Tsai-Lo and Lo proposed a new anonymous authentication scheme based on nonce
and bilinear pairing [12], which supports mutual authentication, key exchange, user anonymity, and
user untraceability. It is claimed that their scheme withstands all major security threats and meets
general security requirements. In addition, no verification table is required to be implemented at
service providers or the trusted SCG service.
He et al. (2017) proposed a data aggregation scheme [13] that can thwart internal attacks for the
smart grid environment. They claimed their scheme is provably secure and can meet the security
requirements, and incurs lower communication costs.
H. Xiong briefly described the work of [9] in [14], and according to their opinion, certificate
managements, scalability, and forward security are the three parts that can be improved in the scheme
of the work of [9]. In his scheme, only registered users can authenticate each other and build a shared
key, besides, this shared key is only known by the two registered users and the network manager
would not know this shared key. Also, according to the public information transmitted between the
two users, an adversary is unable to learn this shared key. However, in this scheme, the server does not
check the validity of incoming users. Li and J. Hong proposed a modified BDCPS scheme [15], which
is an efficient certificate-less access control for wireless body area networks. In this scheme, every user
first generates a public key pair (xU , yU = gxU ), and then registers at a key generating center (KGC),
to get a partial private key DU = 1H2(yU ,IDU)+S P. After the user gets this partial private key, he can
generate his public key pair (yU , hU , TU). As only registered user could generate this public key pair,
this public key pair can be used as a measure to test if a user is legal or not, as only the public key is
transferred, so the identity of the user is hidden.
Liu et al. (2016) proposed an authentication scheme [16] which could well protect the identity and
privacy of the user, while the scheme is very cost-effective compared to [9]. Islam and Khan proposed
a partial public key method [17], where a user registers at the server several times in order to get more
than one authentication keys, then the user uses different keys for authentication to achieve anonymity.
He et al. (2015) applied the partial key concept to the vehicular ad hoc networks, and proposed an
efficient identity-based privacy preserving authentication scheme, and their scheme enables batch
verification of multiple messages [18]. Further, they applied a similar method into public auditing in
cloud-based body area networks in [19], by D. He, S. Zeadally, and L. Wu.
Porambage et al. (2014) proposed a pervasive authentication protocol and key establishment
scheme [20], their scheme is also based on a partial public key method. But in their scheme, CertU is a
fixed value, so the user in this scheme could be tracked by CertU . The registration phase of FAuth is
similar to those of [13,20].
Zhang et al. (2014) proposed a scheme based on ECC public key infrastructure [21], but they do
not take into account the anonymity of the user, as the user names are sent directly. In [22], Tu et al.
(2015) improved the scheme [21], but the username is sent without processing, too. Odelu et al.
(2015) [23] proposed an authentication scheme between two users, with the help of a server node, the
scheme is also based on a partial public key by elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). They also proposed
a similar authentication scheme between two users, but their scheme does not need there to be a
trusted server to help the two users to finish the authentication process, as the scheme uses the ECC
based El-Gammal type signature [24].
The scheme in [25] is the first one that defines a formal model to capture the feature of
user untraceability, and that highlights the damaging threat of de-synchronization attacks on
privacy-preserving two-factor authentication schemes.
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The schemes in [26–29], and [30] use elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) to generate a shared key
with the server. The scheme in [30] suffers from impersonation attacks in the registration phase, offline
password guessing attacks in the login phase, and offline password guessing attacks in the password
change phase. The schemes in [31,32] provide a lightweight scheme based on ECC, but they do not
protect the privacy of the user, since the user names are sent transparently. Huang et al. (2015) provides
an ECC-based authentication scheme between user and server [33], while their scheme is found to
be vulnerable to inner side impersonate attacks by [34] by Chaudhry et al. (2016). Li et al. (2015) [35]
provide an authentication between user and cloud server, as they use a symmetric key as a way of
authentication, and an asymmetric key to establish the shared key, but the UIDi of a user is transferred
transparently, so a user could be tracked. The method in [11] is similar to [35], only their shared key is
based on a symmetric key, and the scheme in [11] suffers from inner side user attacks, as they shared a
same key. Jiang et al. (2016) built their scheme based on the knowledge of chaotic maps [27].
The proposed scheme: FAuth is an improvement of the schemes of [4,5,36], which specially
focused on the smart meter authentication problem. The second scheme of [36] could not provide
smart meter anonymity at the authentication phase, and suffers from “unknown key share attacks”
according to [4]. According to [5], scheme [4] fails to protect the smart secret credentials if the
ephemeral secret is revealed as an adversary. The registration manner of smart meters and aggregators
in the proposed scheme are changed to provide better security endurance, compared to [5]; besides, a
detailed computation of computation and communication costs were conducted, and all the results
show the proposed scheme is more suitable for smart grid environments.
3. Preliminary
In this section, an introduction to basic knowledge bilinear maps and the computational
Diffie–Hellman problem is introduced.
3.1. Bilinear Map
Central to pairing-based cryptosystems is a bilinear nondegenerate map, originally given as
e : G1 × G1 → G2 , where G1, G2 are both cyclic groups of prime order q, and the discrete log problem
is hard in G1. G1 is a cyclic additive group, and G2 is a cyclic multiplicative group. Bilinear maps have
the following properties:
• Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(aP, bQ)ab for ∀ P, ∀ Q ∈ G1, for ∀ a, b ∈ Z∗q .
• Computability: there is an efficient algorithm to compute P, Q, for ∀ P, ∀ Q ∈ G1.
• Non-degeneracy: ∃ P, Q ∈ G1 with e(P, Q) 6= 1, where 1 is the multiplicative identity of G2.
3.2. Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
Given P, xP, yP ∈ G1, for ∀ x, y ∈ Z∗q . It is infeasible to compute xyP.
4. Review of Odelu’s Scheme
In this section, the authentication scheme proposed by Vanga Odelu, Ashok Kumar Das,
Mohammad Wazid, and Mauro Conti for smart grids is evaluated. Some notions used in their
scheme are listed in Table 1.
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Table 1. Symbols used in Odelu’s scheme.
Symbol Description
G1, G2 Bilinear groups
P Generator of G1
g Generator of G2: g = e(P, P)
q Prime order of G1 and G2
KGC Key Generation Center
(kx, Rx) Private and public key pair of KGC; Rx = kx·P
(Sj, Idj) jth service provider and its identity
(kj, Kj) The public key pair of Sj: kj = H5(SIDj, Kj)
(Mi, Idi) ith smart meter and its identity
(ki, Ri) Key pair of Mi, where ki is kept secret
(x ← RX) x is randomly picked from a set X
|| String connection symbol
4.1. Setup Phase of Odelu’s Scheme
In this phase, KGC, which is a trust key generation center, sets up the parameters using the
following steps:
Step 1 KGC chooses bilinear map groups (G1, G2) with a prime order, q, and generators P ∈ G1, and
g = e(P, P) ∈ G2, where e : G1 × G1 → G2 is the bilinear map.
Step 2 KGC chooses the cryptographic one way hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q ,
H2 : G2 × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}m, H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, H4 : G2 → Z∗q , and H5 : {0, 1}∗ ×G2 → Z∗q ,
where m = n+w, and w is a constant and it is also fixed during the setup phase as in [37],
which is based on the input length of an encryption algorithm used in our authentication
and key agreement phase. Note that in their proposed scheme, w is calculated such that
n+w = 2|q|+ |G1| bits, where |X| denotes the bit length of string X.
Step 3 KGC then chooses its master private key kx ← RX∗q and computes the corresponding public
key Rx = kx·P ∈ G1.
Step 4 finally, KGC declares the public parameter
{
G1, G1, q, e, P, Ppub, g, H1, H2, H3, H4, H5
}
.
4.2. Smart Meter Registration of Their Scheme
First, we have to make it clear that the registration phase is under a secure channel. Suppose a
smart meter Mi wants to register with the KGC. Mi sends its identity, Idi, to KGC via secure channel.
After receiving the identity Idi, KGC conducts the following steps:
1. Selects a random number rm ← RX∗q , Rm = rm·P
2. Computes ki = H5(Idi , Rm)kx + rm (mod q) (El-Gamal type signature on Idi)
3. Sends (ki, Rm) to Mi
When smart meter Mi receives (ki, Rm), it stores them in the tamper-proof module. The whole
process is depicted in Table 2.
Table 2. Registration phase of smart meter in Odelu’s scheme.
Smart Meter Mi KGC
Identity Idi (kx, Rx)
Sends {Idi} to TA
{Idi}
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When aggregator ܣܩ௝  receives the data { ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ } from a smart meter, ܯ௜ , ܣܩ௝  will 
conduct the following steps to authenticate the meter ܯ௜: 
1. Checks the freshness of the ܶ ଵܵ, if ܶ ଵܵ is not fresh, ܣܩ௝ abandons the message.
2. Calculates ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ using its private key ௝݇.
3. Decrypts ܥଵ to get (ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁	ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ ).
4. Ch cks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ); if they are not equal, aborts here.
5. Calculates the public key of ܯ௜ ∶ ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫.
6. Chooses a random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 .
7. Calculates ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ.
8. Calculates ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ.
9. Calculates ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ) = ܪସ((ݔଶ + ௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ) = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ).
10. Calculates ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵᇱ ൯.
11. Sends Message 2 = { ଷܶ, ܣଶ} to the client	ܯ௜.
When smart meter ܯ௜ gets the data { ଷܶ, ܣଶ}, ܯ௜ will do the following steps to authenticate this
message. 
6. ܯ௜ computes the shared key using its private key ݇௜: ݏ݇	ᇱ = 	ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ ∙ (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ) 	= ܪସ((ݔଶ +
௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ).
7. ܯ௜  checks if ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯; if they are not equal, aborts here, otherwise
calculates ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; now ܯ௜ has accepted the shared key ݏ݇	ᇱ.
8. Sends Message 3 = {ܣଷ} to ܣܩ௝.
When aggregator ܣܩ௝ gets the data {ܣଷ}, ܣܩ௝ will check if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵᇱ || ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; if they
are equal, ܣܩ௝ , accepts the key	ݏ݇. Now the smart meter ܯ௜, and aggregator ܣܩ௝, have authenticated 
each other and build a shared key. The whole process is depicted in Table 8. 
Table 8. Request and authentication phase of the proposed scheme. 
Smart Meter ࡹ࢏ Aggregator ࡭ࡳ࢐ 
(݇௜, ܴ௜)	 ( ௝݇, ௝ܴ)
random numbers ݔଵ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ
ଵܶ = (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ௝ܴ	
ଵ݃ = ݃(௫భା௞೔)	
ܥଵ = ܪଶ( ଵ݃)	⨁	(ܫ݀௜, ܴ௜௡)
ܣଵ = ܪଷ൫ ଵܶห|ܫ݀௜|หܴ௜௡||ܶ ଵܵ൯		
ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ	 	
(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁ ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ )		
checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ)	
ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫	
random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 	
ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ	
ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ	
ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ)	
ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯	
ݏ݇	ᇱ = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ)
checks if	 ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯
{ ଷܶ, ܣଶ}
ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯
{ܣଷ}	 	 checks if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯	
Both agree on session key ݏ݇
Random rm, Rm = rm·P
ki = H5(Idi, Rm)kx + rm
Stores {ki, Rm} {ki, Rm}
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When aggregator ܣܩ௝  receives the data { ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ } from a smart meter, ܯ௜ , ܣܩ௝  will 
conduct the following steps to authenticate the meter ܯ௜: 
1. Checks the freshness of the ܶ ଵܵ, if ܶ ଵܵ is not fresh, ܣܩ௝ abandons the message.
2. Calculates ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ using its private key ௝݇.
3. Decrypts ܥଵ to get (ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁	ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ ).
4. Checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ); if they are not equal, aborts here.
5. Calculates the public key of ܯ௜ ∶ ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫.
6. Chooses a random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 .
7. Calculates ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ.
8. Calculates ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ.
9. Calculates ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ) = ܪସ((ݔଶ + ௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ) = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ).
10. Calculates ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵᇱ ൯.
11. Sends Message 2 = { ଷܶ, ܣଶ} to the client	ܯ௜.
When smart meter ܯ௜ gets the data { ଷܶ, ܣଶ}, ܯ௜ will do the following step  to authenticate this
message. 
6. ܯ௜ computes the shared key using its private key ݇௜: ݏ݇	ᇱ = 	ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ ∙ (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ) 	= ܪସ((ݔଶ +
௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ).
7. ܯ௜  checks if ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯; if they are not equal, aborts here, otherwise
calculates ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; now ܯ௜ has accepted the shared key ݏ݇	ᇱ.
8. Sends Message 3 = {ܣଷ} to ܣܩ௝.
When aggregator ܣܩ௝ gets the data {ܣଷ}, ܣܩ௝ will check if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵᇱ || ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; if they
are equal, ܣܩ௝ , accepts the key	ݏ݇. Now the smart meter ܯ௜, and aggregator ܣܩ௝, have authenticated 
each other and build a shared key. The whole process is depicted in Table 8. 
Table 8. Request and authentication phase of the proposed scheme. 
Smart Meter ࡹ࢏ Aggregator ࡭ࡳ࢐ 
(݇௜, ܴ௜)	 ( ௝݇, ௝ܴ)
random numbers ݔଵ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ
ଵܶ = (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ௝ܴ	
ଵ݃ = ݃(௫భା௞೔)	
ܥଵ = ܪଶ( ଵ݃)	⨁	(ܫ݀௜, ܴ௜௡)
ܣଵ = ܪଷ൫ ଵܶห|ܫ݀௜|หܴ௜௡||ܶ ଵܵ൯
{ ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ}	 	 ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ	 	
(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁ ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ )		
checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ)	
ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫	
random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 	
ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ	
ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ	
ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ)	
ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯	
ݏ݇	ᇱ = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ)
checks if	 ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯
{ ଷܶ, ܣଶ}
ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯
{ܣଷ}	 	 checks if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯	
Both agree on session key ݏ݇
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4.3. Service Provider Registration of Their Scheme
When a service provider Sj wants to join the system, it has to first register at KGC. Sj sends
its identity, Idj, to KGC. After receiving the identity Idj, KGC calculates the private key Kj =
1
kx+ H1( Idj)
·P, and sends Kj to Sj. When smart meter Sj receives Kj, it computes k j = H5
(
Idj, Kj
)
, and
stores
(
k j, Kj
)
into the tamper-proof module. The whole process is depicted in Table 3.
Table 3. Registration phase of service provider in Odelu’s scheme.
Service Provider Sj KGC
Identity Idj (kx, Rx)
Sends
{
Idj
}
to TA{
Idj
}
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When aggregator ܣܩ௝  receives the data { ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ } from a smart meter, ܯ௜ , ܣܩ௝  will 
conduct the following steps to authenticate the meter ܯ௜: 
1. Checks the freshness of the ܶ ଵܵ, if ܶ ଵܵ is not fresh, ܣܩ௝ abandons the message.
2. Calculates ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ using its private key ௝݇.
3. Decrypts ܥଵ to get (ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁	ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ ).
4. Checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ); if they are not equal, aborts here.
5. Calculates the public key of ܯ௜ ∶ ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫.
6. Chooses a random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 .
7. Calculates ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ.
8. Calculates ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ.
9. Calculates ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ) = ܪସ((ݔଶ + ௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ) = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ).
10. Calculates ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵᇱ ൯.
11. Sends Message 2 = { ଷܶ, ܣଶ} to the client	ܯ௜.
When smart meter ܯ௜ gets the data { ଷܶ, ܣଶ}, ܯ௜ will do the following steps to authenticate this
message. 
6. ܯ௜ computes the shared key using its private key ݇௜: ݏ݇	ᇱ = 	ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ ∙ (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ) 	= ܪସ((ݔଶ +
௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ).
7. ܯ௜  checks if ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯; if they are not equal, aborts here, otherwise
calculates ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; now ܯ௜ has accepted the shared key ݏ݇	ᇱ.
8. Sends Message 3 = {ܣଷ} to ܣܩ௝.
When aggregator ܣܩ௝ gets the data {ܣଷ}, ܣܩ௝ will check if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵᇱ || ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; if they
are equal, ܣܩ௝ , accepts the key	ݏ݇. Now the smart meter ܯ௜, and aggregator ܣܩ௝, have authenticated 
each other and build a shared key. The whole process is depicted in Table 8. 
Table 8. Request and authentication phase of the proposed scheme. 
Smart Meter ࡹ࢏ Aggregator ࡭ࡳ࢐ 
(݇௜, ܴ௜)	 ( ௝݇, ௝ܴ)
random numbers ݔଵ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ
ଵܶ = (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ௝ܴ	
ଵ݃ = ݃(௫భା௞೔)	
ܥଵ = ܪଶ( ଵ݃)	⨁	(ܫ݀௜, ܴ௜௡)
ܣଵ = ܪଷ൫ ଵܶห|ܫ݀௜|หܴ௜௡||ܶ ଵܵ൯		
ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ	 	
(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁ ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ )		
checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ)	
ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫	
random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 	
ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ	
ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ	
ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ)	
ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯	
ݏ݇	ᇱ = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ)
checks if	 ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯
{ ଷܶ, ܣଶ}
ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯
{ܣଷ}	 	 checks if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯	
Both agree on session key ݏ݇
Kj = 1kx+ H1( Idj) ·P
kj = H5(Idj, Kj)
Stores
{
kj, Kj
} {Kj}
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When aggregator ܣܩ௝  receives the data { ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ } from a smart meter, ܯ௜ , ܣܩ௝  will 
conduct the following steps to authenticate the meter ܯ௜: 
1. Checks the freshness of the ܶ ଵܵ, if ܶ ଵܵ is not fresh, ܣܩ௝ abandons the message.
2. Calculates ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ using its private key ௝݇.
3. Decrypts ܥଵ to get (ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁	ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ ).
4. Checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ); if they are not equal, aborts here.
5. Calculates the public key of ܯ௜ ∶ ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫.
6. Chooses a random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 .
7. Calculates ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ.
8. Calculates ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ.
9. Calculates ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ) = ܪସ((ݔଶ + ௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ) = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ).
10. Calculates ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵᇱ ൯.
11. Sends Message 2 = { ଷܶ, ܣଶ} to he client	ܯ௜.
When smart meter ܯ௜ gets the data { ଷܶ, ܣଶ}, ܯ௜ will do the following steps to authenticate this
message. 
6. ܯ௜ computes the shared key using its private key ݇௜: ݏ݇	ᇱ = 	ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ ∙ (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ) 	= ܪସ((ݔଶ +
௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ).
7. ܯ௜  checks if ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ 	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯; if they are not equal, aborts here, otherwise
calculates ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; now ܯ௜ has accepted the shared key ݏ݇	ᇱ.
8. Sends Message 3 = {ܣଷ} to ܣܩ௝.
When aggregator ܣܩ௝ gets the data {ܣଷ}, ܣܩ௝ will check if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵᇱ || ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; if they
are equal, ܣܩ௝ , acc pts the key	ݏ݇. Now the smart meter ܯ௜, and aggregator ܣܩ௝, have authenticated 
each other and build a shared key. The whole process is depicted in Table 8. 
Table 8. Request and authentication phase of the proposed scheme. 
Smart Meter ࡹ࢏ Aggregator ࡭ࡳ࢐ 
(݇௜, ܴ௜)	 ( ௝݇, ௝ܴ)
random numbers ݔଵ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ
ଵܶ = (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ௝ܴ	
ଵ݃ = ݃(௫భା௞೔)	
ܥଵ = ܪଶ( ଵ݃)	⨁	(ܫ݀௜, ܴ௜௡)
ܣଵ = ܪଷ൫ ଵܶห|ܫ݀௜|หܴ௜௡||ܶ ଵܵ൯
{ ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ}	 	 ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ	 	
(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁ ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ )		
checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ)	
ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫	
random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 	
ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ	
ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ	
ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ)	
ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯	
ݏ݇	ᇱ = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ)
checks if	 ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯
{ ଷܶ, ܣଶ}
ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯
{ܣଷ}	 	 checks if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯	
Both agree on session key ݏ݇
4.4. Authentication and Key Establishment Phase of Their Scheme
In the authentication phase of their scheme, smart meter Mi and service provider Sj could
authenticate each other without the help of KGC.
1. Mi chooses two random numbers x1, n1 ← RZ∗q , and then computes T1 =
(x1 + ki)(H1(Idj)P + Rx)), g1 = gx1+ki , C1 = H2(g1, Idj)
⊕
(Idi, Rm, n1) and A1 =
H3(T1||Idi||Rm||n1||g1). Mi sends request message Message1 = {T1, C1, A1} to Sj.
2. Upon receiving the message {T1, C1, A1} from Mi, Sj derives g1 = e(T1, Kj), using its own
private key Kj. Then, it computes (Idi, Rm, n1) = C1
⊕
H2(g1, Idj) . Sj then checks if
A1 = H3(T1||Idi||Rm||n1||g1); if it does not hold, Sj terminates the session, otherwise, Sj chooses
a random number x2 ← RX∗q and computes g2 = e((x2 + k j)P, H5(Idi, Rm)Rx + Rm) = g(x2+kj)ki ,
the session key sk = H4(g
x2+kj
1 ) and A2 = H3(sk||g2||Idj||Idi||n1||g1), and Sj then sends
Message2 = {g2, A2} to Mi.
3. After receiving {g2, A2} from Sj, Mi computes the session key sk = H4(g(x1+ki)/ki2 ). Next
Mi checks if A2 = H3(sk||g2||Idj||Idi||n1||g1). If it does not hold, Mi terminates the session.
Otherwise, Mi authenticates Sj as a valid target server, and sets sk as the session key. Mi then
computes A3 = H3(sk||Idi||n1||g1||g2||Idj) and sends Message3 = {A3} to Sj.
4. Upon receiving {A3}, Sj checks if A3 = H3(sk||Idi||n1||g1||g2||Idj). It this does not hold, Sj
terminates the session. Otherwise, Sj confirms that Mi is a legitimate registered smart meter, and
agrees with the session key sk.
Now both Sj and Mi agree on the shared key, sk, and the information flow is depicted in the
following Table 4.
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Table 4. Authentication phase of Odelu’s scheme.
Smart Meter Mi Provider Sj.
(ki, Ri) (kj, Kj)
Random numbers x1, n1 ← RX∗q .
T1 = (x1 + ki)(H1(Idj)P + Rx)
g1 = gx1+xi
C1 = H2(g1, Idj)
⊕
(Idi, Rm, n1)
A1 = H3(T1||Idi||Rm||n1||g1)
{T1, C1, A1}
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When aggregator ܣܩ௝  receives the data { ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ } from a smart meter, ܯ௜ , ܣܩ௝  will 
conduct the following steps to authenticate the meter ܯ௜: 
1. Checks the freshness of the ܶ ଵܵ, if ܶ ଵܵ is not fresh, ܣܩ௝ abandons the message.
2. Calculates ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ using its private key ௝݇.
3. Decrypts ܥଵ to get (ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁	ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ ).
4. Checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ); if they are not equal, aborts here.
5. Calculates the public key of ܯ௜ ∶ ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫.
6. Chooses a random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 .
7. Calculates ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ.
8. Calculates ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ.
9. Calculates ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ) = ܪସ((ݔଶ + ௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ) = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ).
10. Calculates ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵᇱ ൯.
11. Sends Message 2 = { ଷܶ, ܣଶ} to the client	ܯ௜.
When smart meter ܯ௜ gets the data { ଷܶ, ܣଶ}, ܯ௜ will do the following steps to authenticate this
message. 
6. ܯ௜ computes the shared key using its private key ݇௜: ݏ݇	ᇱ = 	ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ ∙ (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ) 	= ܪସ((ݔଶ +
௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ).
7. ܯ௜  checks if ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯; if they are not equal, aborts here, otherwise
calculates ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; now ܯ௜ has accepted the shared key ݏ݇	ᇱ.
8. Sends Message 3 = {ܣଷ} to ܣܩ௝.
When aggregator ܣܩ௝ gets the data {ܣଷ}, ܣܩ௝ will check if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵᇱ || ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; if they
are equal, ܣܩ௝ , accepts the key	ݏ݇. Now the smart meter ܯ௜, and aggregator ܣܩ௝, have authenticated 
each other and build a shared key. The whole process is depicted in Table 8. 
Table 8. Request and authentication phase of the proposed scheme. 
Smart Meter ࡹ࢏ Aggregator ࡭ࡳ࢐ 
(݇௜, ܴ௜)	 ( ௝݇, ௝ܴ)
random numbers ݔଵ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ
ଵܶ = (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ௝ܴ	
ଵ݃ = ݃(௫భା௞೔)	
ܥଵ = ܪଶ( ଵ݃)	⨁	(ܫ݀௜, ܴ௜௡)
ܣଵ ܪଷ൫ ଵܶห|ܫ݀௜|หܴ௜௡||ܶ ଵܵ൯		
ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ	 	
(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁ ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ )		
checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ)	
ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫	
random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 	
ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ	
ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ	
ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ)	
ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯	
ݏ݇	ᇱ = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ)
checks if	 ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯
{ ଷܶ, ܣଶ}
ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯
{ܣଷ}	 	 checks if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯	
Both agree on session key ݏ݇
g1 = e(T1, Kj)
(Idi, Rm, n1) = C1
⊕
H2(g1, Idj)
Checks if A1 = H3(T1||Idi||Rm||n1||g1)
Random number x1 ← RX∗q
g2 = e
(
(x2 + kj)P, H5(Idi, Rm)Rx + Rm
)
= g(x2+k j)si
sk = H4(g
x2+k j
1 )
A2 = H3(sk||g2||Idj||Idi||n1||g1)
sk = H4(g
(x1+ki)/ki
2 )
Checks if
A2 = H3(sk||g2||Idj||Idi||n1||g1)
{g2, A2}
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hen aggregator ܣܩ௝  receives the data { ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ } fro  a s art eter, ௜ , ܣܩ௝  ill 
conduct the follo ing steps to authenticate the eter ௜: 
1. Checks the freshness of the ܶ ଵܵ, if ܶ ଵܵ is not fresh, ܣܩ௝ abandons the essage.
2. Calculates ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ using its private key ௝݇.
3. Decrypts ܥଵ to get (ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ 	ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ ).
4. Checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ); if they are not equal, aborts here.
5. Calculates the public key of ௜ ∶ ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫.
6. Chooses a rando  nu ber ݔଶ
	 ܺ௤∗ோ	 .
7. Calculates ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ.
8. Calculates ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ.
9. Calculates ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ) = ܪସ((ݔଶ + ௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ) = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ).
10. Calculates ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵᇱ ൯.
11. Sends essage 2 = { ଷܶ, ܣଶ} to the client	 ௜.
hen s art eter ௜ gets the data { ଷܶ, ܣଶ}, ௜ ill do the follo ing steps to authenticate this
essage. 
6. ௜ co putes the shared key using its private key ݇௜: ݏ݇	ᇱ = 	ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ ∙ (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ) 	= ܪସ((ݔଶ +
௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ).
7. ௜  checks if ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯; if they are not equal, aborts here, other ise
calculates ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; no  ௜ has accepted the shared key ݏ݇	ᇱ.
8. Sends essage 3 = {ܣଷ} to ܣܩ௝.
hen aggregator ܣܩ௝ gets the data {ܣଷ}, ܣܩ௝ ill check if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵᇱ || ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; if they
are equal, ܣܩ௝ , accepts the key	ݏ݇. o  the s art eter ௜, and aggregator ܣܩ௝, have authenticated 
each other and build a shared key. The hole process is depicted in Table 8. 
Table 8. Request and authentication phase of the proposed scheme. 
S art eter ࢏ Aggregator ࡭ࡳ࢐ 
(݇௜, ܴ௜)	 ( ௝݇, ௝ܴ)
rando  nu bers ݔଵ
	 ܺ௤∗ோ
ଵܶ = (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ௝ܴ	
ଵ݃ = ݃(௫భା௞೔)	
ܥଵ = ܪଶ( ଵ݃)	 	(ܫ݀௜, ܴ௜௡)
ܣଵ ܪଷ൫ ଵܶห ܫ݀௜ หܴ௜௡||ܶ ଵܵ൯
{ ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ}	 	 ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ	 	
(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ )		
checks if ܣଵ ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ 	
ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫	
rando  nu ber ݔଶ
	 ܺ௤∗ோ	 	
ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ	
ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ	
ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ)	
ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯	
ݏ݇	ᇱ = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ)
checks if	 ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯
{ ଷܶ, ܣଶ}
ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯
{ܣଷ}	 	 checks if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯	
Both agree on session key ݏ݇
A3 H3(sk||Idi||n1||g1 |g2||Idj)
A3
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When aggregator ܣܩ௝  receives the data { ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ } fr m a smart meter, ܯ௜ , ܣܩ௝  will 
conduct the following steps to authenticate the meter ܯ௜: 
1. Checks the freshness of th  ܶ ଵܵ, if ܶ ଵܵ is not fr sh, ܣܩ௝ abandons the message.
2. Calculates ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ using its private key ௝݇.
3. De rypts ܥଵ to get (ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁	ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ ).
4. Checks if ଵ ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ || ଵܵ); if they are not equal, aborts here.
5. Calculates the public key of ܯ௜ ∶ ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫.
6. Chooses a random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 .
7. Calculates ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ.
8. Calculates ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ.
9. Calculates ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ) = ܪସ((ݔଶ + ௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ) = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ).
10. Calculates ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵᇱ ൯.
11. Sends Message 2 = { ଷܶ, ܣଶ} to the client	ܯ௜.
When smart meter ܯ௜ gets the data { ଷܶ, ܣଶ}, ܯ௜ will do the following steps to authenticate this
message. 
6. ܯ௜ computes the shared key using its private key ݇௜: ݏ݇	ᇱ = 	ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ ∙ (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ) 	= ܪସ((ݔଶ +
௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ).
7. ܯ௜  checks if ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯; if they are not equal, aborts here, otherwise
calculates ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; now ܯ௜ has accepted the shared key ݏ݇	ᇱ.
8. Sends Message 3 = {ܣଷ} to ܣܩ௝.
When aggregator ܣܩ௝ gets the data {ܣଷ}, ܣܩ௝ will check if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵᇱ || ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; if they
are equal, ܣܩ௝ , accepts the key	ݏ݇. Now the smart meter ܯ௜, and aggregator ܣܩ௝, have authenticated 
each other and build a shared key. The whole process is depicted in Table 8. 
Table 8. Request and authentication phase of the proposed scheme. 
Smart Meter ࡹ࢏ Aggregator ࡭ࡳ࢐ 
(݇௜, ܴ௜)	 ( ௝݇, ௝ܴ)
random numbers ݔଵ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ
ଵܶ = (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ௝ܴ	
ଵ݃ = ݃(௫భା௞೔)	
ܥଵ ଶ( ଵ݃)	⨁	(ܫ݀௜, ܴ௜௡)
ܣଵ = ܪଷ൫ ଵܶห|ܫ݀௜|หܴ௜௡||ܶ ଵܵ൯		
ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ	 	
(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁ ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ )		
checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ)	
ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫	
random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 	
ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ	
ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ	
ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ)	
ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯	
ݏ݇	ᇱ = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ)
checks if	 ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯
{ ଷܶ, ܣଶ}
ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯
{ܣଷ}	 	 checks if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯	
Both agree on session key ݏ݇
Ch if A3 = H3(sk||Idi||n1||g1||g2||Idj)
Both agree on session key sk
5. Security Limitations of Odelu’s Scheme
In the registration phase of Odelu’s scheme, the private key of the smart meter Mi is ki =
H5(Idi, Rm)kx + rm, which is generated by KGC, so KGC knows this private key of the smart meter
Mi. It is the same with the private key of the service provider Sj. So as KGC knows the private keys of
the smart meter parties, although KGC is trust worthy, a curious KGC can launch various attacks.
5.1. Impersonate Attack by KGC
It is obviously that with the private key of smart meters or service provider Sj, KGC could easily
impersonate as a smart meter Mi or a service provider Sj.
5.2. Tracked by KGC
Besides, the private key of the sm rt meter Mi and the service provider Sj are all known by KGC.
This means in the authentication phase, the smart meter Mi could be tracked by KGC. For a smart
meter, it would send {T1, C1, A1} to a service provider Sj, and KGC has the private key of Sj, so KGC
could decrypt C1 to get the identity of Mi, which is Idi. In this way, smart meter Mi could tracked
by KGC.
6. The Proposed Authentication Protocol for Smart Grid
In this section, an introduction of the structure of the system was given, and then we propose
FAuth. A detailed description of the registration phase and the authentication phase is given in
this section.
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6.1. Structure of the Scheme
The model is depicted in Figure 1. The structure is divided into three layers, the first layer is
the server layer, the second layer is the aggregator layer, and the third layer is the smart meter layer,
the smart meters report their reading to the aggregator, the aggregator adds all the smart meters’
reading in its range and reports that to the server.
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In order for the smart meters and aggregators to authenticate each other, we introduce a Key
Generation Center, which works like the Trusted Anchor in [5], which is in charge of the registration of
the smart meter and the aggregators.
The abstract structure is depicted in Figure 2. The Key Generation Center is in charge of the key
generation for the smart meter parties, the smart meters, and the aggregators, and the server has to
register to the KGC before they enter the network.
1. All the members of the scheme, i.e., server, smart meter, and aggregator, have to register at KGC
to get their public key pairs.
2. The aggregator and smart meters have to authenticate each other and build a shared key for
the smart meters to report their reading to the aggregator. The same process happens between
the aggregator and the server. In this paper, we only analyze the first part, because the mutual
authentication process between the aggregator and the server is the same.
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The proposed scheme is an anonymous mutual authentication scheme between the smart meter 
and the aggregator, or the aggregator and the server, and by the proposed scheme, the two parties 
could build a shared key for farther communication. 
6.2. Setup of the Scheme 
The setup phase in the proposed scheme is the same as that in [5], as we have discussed in 4.1. 
ܭܩܥ generates its public key pair (݇௫, ܴ௫) and sends these parameters to all the members of the 
scheme. The symbols we will use in the next section are summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5. Symbols used in the proposed scheme. 
Symbols Description
ܭܩܥ	 Key Generation Center 
ܣܩ௝	 The jth aggregator 
ܯ௜	 The ith smart meter 
ܫ݀௫	 ܭܩܥ’s identity
ܫ݀௜	 The ith smart meter’s identity 
ܫ ௝݀	 The jth aggregator’s identity 
(݇௫, ܴ௫)	 The private key and public key of ܭܩܥ	
( ௝݇, ௝ܴ)	 The private key and public key of Aggregator 
(݇௜, ܴ௜)	 The private key and public key of Smart meter 
ܶ ଵܵ	 Timestamp  
ܪଵ,ܪଶ,ܪଷ, ܪସ, ܪହ	 Hash function  
|| String connection symbol 
6.3. Registration Phase of Smart Meter 
The registration phase of ܯ௜ in the proposed scheme is similar to that of the scheme [20], as 
depicts in Table 6. When a smart meter wants to join, it has to register first. A smart meter with 
identity ܫ݀௜ first generates a random number ݇௨
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 , ܴ௨ = 	݇௨ ∙ ܲ. Then, ܯ௜ sends the registration 
request {ܫ݀௜, ܴ௨} to ܭܩܥ, and ܭܩܥ generates a random number, ݇௡
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 , and calculates ܴ௡ = 	݇௡ ∙
ܲ, ܴ௜௡ = (ܴ௨ + ܴ௡), ݁௜ = ܪ(ܴ௜௡||ܫ݀௜), ݏ௜ = 	 ݁௜ ∙ ݇௡ + ݇௫. Then, ܭܩܥ sends {݁௜, ݏ௜, ܴ௡} back to the smart 
meter. The smart meter calculates its own private ݇௜ = 	 ݏ௜ + ݁௜ ∙ ݇௨ = ݁௜ ∙ ݇௡ + ݁௜ ∙ ݇௨ + ݇௫, and public 
The proposed scheme is an anonymous mutual authentication scheme between the smart meter
and the aggregator, or the aggregator and the server, and by the proposed scheme, the two parties
could build a shared key for farther communication.
6.2. Setup of the Sche e
The setup phase in the proposed sche e is the sa e as that in [5], as e have discussed in 4.1.
KGC generates its public key pair (kx, Rx) and sends these para eters to all the e bers of the
sche e. The sy bols e ill use in the next section are su arized in Table 5.
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Table 5. Symbols used in the proposed scheme.
Symbols Description
KGC Key Generation Center
AGj The jth aggregator
Mi The ith smart meter
Idx KGC’s identity
Idi The ith smart meter’s identity
Idj The jth aggregator’s identity
(kx, Rx) The private key and public key of KGC
(kj, Rj) The private key and public key of Aggregator
(ki, Ri) The private key and public key of Smart meter
TS1 Timestamp
H1, H2, H3, H4, H5 Hash function
|| String connection symbol
6.3. Registration Phase of Smart Meter
The registration phase of Mi in the proposed scheme is similar to that of the scheme [20], as
depicts in Table 6. When a smart meter wants to join, it has to register first. A smart meter with
identity Idi first generates a random number ku ← RX∗q , Ru = ku·P. Then, Mi sends the registration
request {Idi, Ru} to KGC, and KGC generates a random number, kn ← RX∗q , and calculates Rn = kn·P,
Rin = (Ru + Rn), ei = H(Rin||Idi), si = ei·kn + kx. Then, KGC sends {ei, si, Rn} back to the smart
meter. The smart meter calculates its own private ki = si + ei·ku = ei·kn + ei·ku + kx, and public key
Ri = ei·Rin + Rx = ei·Ru + ei·Rn + Rx. Now the registration phase of the smart meter is finished, and
the private key of the smart meter is only known by the smart meter itself.
Table 6. Registration phase of the smart meter.
Smart Meter Mi KGC
Identity Idi (kx, Rx)
Random number Ru = ku·P
Sends {Idi, Ru} to KGC
{Idi, Ru}
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When aggregator ܣܩ௝  receives the data { ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ } from a smart meter, ܯ௜ , ܣܩ௝  will 
conduct the following steps to authenticate the meter ܯ௜: 
1. Checks the freshness of the ܶ ଵܵ, if ܶ ଵܵ is not fresh, ܣܩ௝ abandons the message.
2. Calculates ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ using its private key ௝݇.
3. Decrypts ܥଵ to get (ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁	ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ ).
4. Checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ); if they are not equal, aborts here.
5. Calculates the public key of ܯ௜ ∶ ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫.
6. Chooses a random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 .
7. Calculates ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ.
8. Calculates ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ.
9. Calculates ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ) = ܪସ((ݔଶ + ௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ) = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ).
10. Calculates ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵᇱ ൯.
11. Sends Message 2 = { ଷܶ, ܣଶ} to the client	ܯ௜.
When smart meter ܯ௜ gets the data { ଷܶ, ܣଶ}, ܯ௜ will do the following steps to authenticate this
message. 
6. ܯ௜ computes the shared key using its private key ݇௜: ݏ݇	ᇱ = 	ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ ∙ (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ) 	= ܪସ((ݔଶ +
௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ).
7. ܯ௜  checks if ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯; if they are not equal, aborts here, otherwise
calculates ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; now ܯ௜ has accepted the shared key ݏ݇	ᇱ.
8. Sends Message 3 = {ܣଷ} to ܣܩ௝.
When a gr g tor ܣܩ௝ gets the data {ܣଷ}, ܣܩ௝ will check if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵᇱ || ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; if they
are equal, ܣܩ௝ , accepts the key	ݏ݇. Now the smart meter ܯ௜, and aggregator ܣܩ௝, have authenticated 
each other and build a shared key. Th  whole process is depicted in Table 8. 
Table 8. Request and authentication phase of the proposed scheme. 
Smart Meter ࡹ࢏ Aggregator ࡭ࡳ࢐ 
(݇௜, ܴ௜)	 ( ௝݇, ௝ܴ)
random numbers ݔଵ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ
ଵܶ = (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ௝ܴ	
ଵ݃ = ݃(௫భା௞೔)	
ܥଵ = ܪଶ( ଵ݃)	⨁	(ܫ݀௜, ܴ௜௡)
ܣଵ = ܪଷ൫ ଵܶห|ܫ݀௜|หܴ௜௡||ܶ ଵܵ൯		
ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ	 	
(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁ ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ )		
checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ)	
ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫	
random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 	
ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ	
ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ	
ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ)	
ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯	
ݏ݇	ᇱ = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ)
checks if	 ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯
{ ଷܶ, ܣଶ}
ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯
{ܣଷ}	 	 checks if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯	
Both agree on session key ݏ݇
Random kn, Rn = kn·P
Rin = (Ru + Rn)
ei = H(Rin||Idi)
si = ei·kn + kx
Rin = (Ru + Rn)
ki = ei·kn + ei·ku + dx
{ei, si, Rn}
Energies 2017, 10, 1354 10 of 21 
When aggregator ܣܩ௝  receives the data { ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ } from a smart meter, ܯ௜ , ܣܩ௝  will 
conduct the following steps to authenticate the meter ܯ௜: 
1. Checks the freshness of the ܶ ଵܵ, if ܶ ଵܵ is not fresh, ܣܩ௝ abandons the message.
2. Calculates ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ using its private key ௝݇.
3. Decrypts ܥଵ to get (ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁	ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ ).
4. Checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ); if they are not equal, aborts here.
5. Calculates the public key of ܯ௜ ∶ ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫.
6. Chooses a random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 .
7. Calculates ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ.
8. Calculates ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ.
9. Calculates ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ) = ܪସ((ݔଶ + ௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ) = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ).
10. Calculates ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵᇱ ൯.
11. Sends Message 2 = { ଷܶ, ܣଶ} to the client	ܯ௜.
When smart meter ܯ௜ gets the data { ଷܶ, ܣଶ}, ܯ௜ will do the following steps to authenticate this
message. 
6. ܯ௜ computes the shared key using its private key ௜: ݏ݇	ᇱ = 	ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ ∙ (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ) 	= ܪସ((ݔଶ +
௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ).
7. ܯ௜  checks if ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯; if they are not equal, aborts here, otherwise
calculates ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; now ܯ௜ has accepted the shared key ݏ݇	ᇱ.
8. Sends Message 3 = {ܣଷ} to ܣܩ௝.
When aggregator ܣܩ௝ gets the data {ܣଷ}, ܣܩ௝ will check if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵᇱ || ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; if they
are equal, ܣܩ௝ , accepts the key	ݏ݇. Now the smart meter ܯ௜, and aggregator ܣܩ௝, have authenticated 
each other and build a shared key. The whole process is depicted in Table 8. 
Table 8. Request and authentication phase of th  propo ed scheme. 
Smart Meter ࡹ࢏ Aggregator ࡭ࡳ࢐ 
(݇௜, ܴ௜)	 ( ௝݇, ௝ܴ)
random numbers ݔଵ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ
ଵܶ = (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ௝ܴ	
ଵ݃ = ݃(௫భା௞೔)	
ܥଵ = ܪଶ( ଵ݃)	⨁	(ܫ݀௜, ܴ௜௡)
ܣଵ = ܪଷ൫ ଵܶห|ܫ݀௜|หܴ௜௡||ܶ ଵܵ൯
{ ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ}	 	 ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ	 	
(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁ ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ )		
checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ)	
ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫	
random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 	
ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ	
ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ	
ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ)	
ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯	
ݏ݇	ᇱ = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ)
checks if	 ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯
{ ଷܶ, ܣଶ}
ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯
{ܣଷ}	 	 checks if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯	
Both agree on session key ݏ݇
Ri = ei·Rin + Rx
Stores { ki, Ri, Rin}
6.4. Registration Phase of Aggregator
The registration phase of an aggregator, AGj, is the same as with the smart meter Mi, the process
is depicts in Table 7. Finally, an aggregator will get a public key pair: private key k j = sj + ej·kc =
ej·km + ej·kc + kx, and public key Rj = ej·Rjm + Rx.
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Table 7. Registration phase of the aggregator.
Aggregator AGj KGC
Identity Idj (kx, Rx)
Random number Rc = kc·P
Sends
{
Idj, Rc
}
to KGC{
Idj, Rc
}
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When aggregator ܣܩ௝  receives the data { ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ } from a smart meter, ܯ௜ , ܣܩ௝  will 
conduct the following steps to authenticate the meter ܯ௜: 
1. Checks the freshness of the ܶ ଵܵ, if ܶ ଵܵ is not fresh, ܣܩ௝ abandons the message.
2. Calculates ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ using its private key ௝݇.
3. Decrypts ܥଵ to get (ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁	ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ ).
4. Checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ); if they are not equal, aborts here.
5. Calculates the public key of ܯ௜ ∶ ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫.
6. Chooses a random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 .
7. Calculates ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ.
8. Calculates ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ.
9. Calculates ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ) = ܪସ((ݔଶ + ௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ) = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ).
10. Calculates ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵᇱ ൯.
11. Sends Message 2 = { ଷܶ, ܣଶ} to the client	ܯ௜.
When smart meter ܯ௜ gets the data { ଷܶ, ܣଶ}, ܯ௜ will do the following steps to authenticate this
message. 
6. ܯ௜ computes the shared key using its private key ݇௜: ݏ݇	ᇱ = 	ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ ∙ (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ) 	= ܪସ((ݔଶ +
௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ).
7. ܯ௜  checks if ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯; if they are not equal, aborts here, otherwise
calculates ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; now ܯ௜ has accepted the shared key ݏ݇	ᇱ.
8. Sends Message 3 = {ܣଷ} to ܣܩ௝.
When aggregator ܣܩ௝ gets the data {ܣଷ}, ܣܩ௝ will check if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵᇱ || ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; if they
are equal, ܣܩ௝ , accepts the key	ݏ݇. Now the smart meter ܯ௜, and aggregator ܣܩ௝, have authenticated 
each other and build a shared key. The whole process is depicted in Table 8. 
Table 8. Request and authentication phase of the proposed scheme. 
Smart Meter ࡹ࢏ Aggregator ࡭ࡳ࢐ 
(݇௜, ܴ௜)	 ( ௝݇, ௝ܴ)
random numbers ݔଵ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ
ଵܶ = (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ௝ܴ	
ଵ݃ = ݃(௫భା௞೔)	
ܥଵ = ܪଶ( ଵ݃)	⨁	(ܫ݀௜, ܴ௜௡)
ܣଵ = ܪଷ൫ ଵܶห|ܫ݀௜|หܴ௜௡||ܶ ଵܵ൯		
ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ	 	
(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁ ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ )		
checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ)	
ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫	
random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 	
ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ	
ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ	
ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ)	
ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯	
ݏ݇	ᇱ = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ)
checks if	 ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯
{ ଷܶ, ܣଶ}
ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯
{ܣଷ}	 	 checks if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯	
Both agree on session key ݏ݇
Random km, Rm = km·P
Rjm = (Rc + Rm)
ej = H(Rjm||Idj)
sj = ej·km + kx
Rjm = (Rc + Rm)
kj = ej·km + ej·kc + kx
{
sj, ej, Rm
}
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When aggregator ܣܩ௝  receives the data { ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ } from a smart meter, ܯ௜ , ܣܩ௝  will 
conduct the following steps to authenticate the meter ܯ௜: 
1. Checks the freshness of the ܶ ଵܵ, if ܶ ଵܵ is not fresh, ܣܩ௝ abandons the message.
2. Calculates ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ using its private key ௝݇.
3. Decrypts ܥଵ to get (ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁	ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ ).
4. Checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ); if they are not equal, aborts here.
5. Calculates the public key of ܯ௜ ∶ ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫.
6. Chooses a random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 .
7. Calculates ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ.
8. Calculates ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ.
9. Calculates ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ) = ܪସ((ݔଶ + ௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ) = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ).
10. Calculates ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵᇱ ൯.
11. Sends Message 2 = { ଷܶ, ܣଶ} to the client	ܯ௜.
When smart meter ܯ௜ gets the data { ଷܶ, ܣଶ}, ܯ௜ will do the following steps to authenticate this
message. 
6. ܯ௜ computes the shared key using its private key ݇௜: ݏ݇	ᇱ = 	ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ ∙ (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ) 	= ܪସ((ݔଶ +
௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ).
7. ܯ௜  checks if ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯; if they are not equal, aborts here, otherwise
calculates ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; now ܯ௜ has accepted the shared key ݏ݇	ᇱ.
8. Sends Message 3 = {ܣଷ} to ܣܩ௝.
When aggregator ܣܩ௝ gets the data {ܣଷ}, ܣܩ௝ will check if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵᇱ || ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; if they
are equal, ܣܩ௝ , accepts the key	ݏ݇. Now the smart meter ܯ௜, and aggregator ܣܩ௝, have authenticated 
each other and build a shared key. The whole process is depicted in Table 8. 
Tabl  8. Request and authentication phase of the proposed sch me. 
Smart Meter ࡹ࢏ Aggregator ࡭ࡳ࢐ 
(݇௜, ܴ௜)	 ( ௝݇, ௝ܴ)
random numbers ݔଵ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ
ଵܶ = (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ௝ܴ	
ଵ݃ = ݃(௫భା௞೔)	
ܥଵ = ܪଶ( ଵ݃)	⨁	(ܫ݀௜, ܴ௜௡)
ܣଵ = ܪଷ൫ ଵܶห|ܫ݀௜|หܴ௜௡||ܶ ଵܵ൯
{ ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ}	 	 ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ	 	
(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁ ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ )		
checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ)	
ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫	
random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 	
ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ	
ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ	
ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ)	
ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯	
ݏ݇	ᇱ = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ)
checks if	 ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯
{ ଷܶ, ܣଶ}
ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯
{ܣଷ}	 	 checks if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯	
Both agree on session key ݏ݇
Rj = ej·Rjm + Rx
Stores
{
kj, Rjm, Rj
}
6.5. Request and Authentication P ase
Smart meter, Mi, with identity, Idi, first has to perform the following steps to be anonymously
authenticated by an aggregator. Only after mutual authentication, can the smart meter then report its
reading to the aggregator.
1. Smart meter, Mi, with identity, Idi, chooses a random number x1 ← RX∗q , and calculates
T1 = (x1 + ki)·Rj, g1 = g(x1+ki).
2. Using the hashed value of g1 to encrypt its identity, Idi, and Rin: C1 = H2(g1)
⊕
(Idi, Rin).
3. Gets the timestamp TS1.
4. Calculates the hashed value: A1 = H3(T1||Idi||Rin||TS1).
5. Sends Message 1 = { T1, C1, A1, TS1} to the aggregator.
When aggregator AGj receives the data {T1, C1, A1, TS1} from a smart meter, Mi, AGj will conduct
the following steps to authenticate the meter Mi:
1. Checks the freshness of the TS1, if TS1 is not fresh, AGj abandons the message.
2. Calculates g′1 = e(T1, P)
1/kj using its private key k j.
3. Decrypts C1 to get
(
Id′i, R
′
in
)
= C1
⊕
H2
(
g′1
)
.
4. Checks if A1 = H3
(
T1||Id′i||R′in||TS1
)
; if they are not equal, aborts here.
5. Calculates the public key of Mi : R′i = H5
(
Id′i, R
′
in
)·R′in + Rx.
6. Chooses a random number x2 ← RX∗q .
7. Calculates T2 =
(
x2 + k j
)·k−1j ·T1.
8. Calculates T3 =
(
x2 + k j
) ·R′i.
9. Calculates sk = H4(T2) = H4(
(
x2 + k j
)·k−1j ·T1) = H4(k−1i (x1 + ki)·T3).
10. Calculates A2 = H3
(
sk||T3||Idj||Id′i||TS1||g′1
)
.
11. Sends Message 2 = {T3, A2} to the client Mi.
When smart meter Mi gets the data {T3, A2}, Mi will do the following steps to authenticate
this message.
6. Mi computes the shared key using its private key ki: sk′ = H4(k−1i ·(x1 + ki)·T3) =
H4(
(
x2 + k j
)·k−1j ·T1).
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7. Mi checks if A2 = H3
(
sk′||T3||Idj||Idi||TS1||g1
)
; if they are not equal, aborts here, otherwise
calculates A3 = H3
(
sk′||Idi||g1||T3||Idj
)
; now Mi has accepted the shared key sk′.
8. Sends Message 3 = {A3} to AGj.
When aggregator AGj gets the data {A3}, AGj will check if A3 = H3
(
sk||Id′i||g′1||T3||Idj
)
; if they
are equal, AGj, accepts the key sk. Now the smart meter Mi, and aggregator AGj, have authenticated
each other and build a shared key. The whole process is depicted in Table 8.
Table 8. Request and authentication phase of the proposed scheme.
Smart Meter Mi Aggregator AGj
(ki, Ri) (kj, Rj)
random numbers x1 ← RX∗q
T1 = (x1 + ki)·Rj
g1 = g(x1+ki)
C1 = H2(g1)
⊕
(Idi, Rin)
A1 = H3(T1||Idi||Rin||TS1)
{T1, C1, A1, TS1}
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When aggregator ܣܩ௝  receives the data { ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ } from a smart meter, ܯ௜ , ܣܩ௝  will 
conduct the following steps to authenticate the meter ܯ௜: 
1. Checks the freshness of the ܶ ଵܵ, if ܶ ଵܵ is not fresh, ܣܩ௝ abandons the message.
2. Calculates ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ using its private key ௝݇.
3. Decrypts ܥଵ to get (ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁	ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ ).
4. Checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ); if they are not equal, aborts here.
5. Calculates the public key of ܯ௜ ∶ ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫.
6. Chooses a random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 .
7. Calculates ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ.
8. Calculates ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ.
9. Calculates ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ) = ܪସ((ݔଶ + ௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ) = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ).
10. Calculates ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵᇱ ൯.
11. Sends Message 2 = { ଷܶ, ܣଶ} to the client	ܯ௜.
When smart meter ܯ௜ gets the data { ଷܶ, ܣଶ}, ܯ௜ will do the following steps to authenticate this
messa . 
6. ܯ௜ computes the shared key using its private key ݇௜: ݏ݇	ᇱ = 	ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ ∙ (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ) 	= ܪସ((ݔଶ +
௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ).
7. ܯ௜  checks if ܣଶ ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ ଷܶ| ܫ ௝݀ ܫ݀௜ |ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯; if t ey ar  not equal, aborts here, otherwise
calculates ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; now ܯ௜ has accepted the shared key ݏ݇	ᇱ.
8. Sends Message 3 = {ܣଷ} to ܣܩ௝.
When aggregator ܣܩ௝ gets the data {ܣଷ}, ܣܩ௝ will check if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵᇱ || ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; if they
are equal, ܣܩ௝ , accepts the key	ݏ݇. Now the smart meter ܯ௜, and aggregator ܣܩ௝, have authenticated 
each other and build a shared key. The whole process is depicted in Table 8. 
Table 8. Request and authentication phase of the proposed scheme. 
Smart Meter ࡹ࢏ Aggregator ࡭ࡳ࢐ 
(݇௜, ܴ௜)	 ( ௝݇, ௝ܴ)
random numbers ݔଵ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ
ଵܶ = (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ௝ܴ	
ଵ݃ = ݃(௫భା௞೔)	
ܥଵ = ܪଶ( ଵ݃)	⨁	(ܫ݀௜, ܴ௜௡)
ܣଵ ܪଷ൫ ଵܶห|ܫ݀௜|หܴ௜௡||ܶ ଵܵ൯		
ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ	 	
(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁ ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ )		
checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ)	
ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫	
random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 	
ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ	
ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ	
ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ)	
ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯	
ݏ݇	ᇱ = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ)
checks if	 ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯
{ ଷܶ, ܣଶ}
ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯
{ܣଷ}	 	 checks if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯	
Both agree on session key ݏ݇
g′1 = e(T1, P)
1/k j
(Id′i , R
′
in) = C1
⊕
H2(g′1)
checks if A1 = H3(T1||Id′i ||R′in||TS1)
R′i = H5(Id
′
i , R
′
in)·R′in + Rx
random number x2 ← RX∗q
T2 = (x2 + kj)·k−1j ·T1
T3 = (x2 + kj) ·R′i
sk = H4(T2)
A2 = H3(sk||T3||Idj||Id′i ||TS1||g1)
sk′ = H4(k−1i (x1 + ki)·T3)
checks if A2 H3(sk′| T3| Idj||Idi||TS1||g1)
{T3, A2}
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When aggregator ܣܩ௝  receives the data { ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ } from a smart meter, ܯ௜ , ܣܩ௝  will 
conduct the following steps to authenticate the meter ܯ௜: 
1. Checks the freshness of the ܶ ଵܵ, if ܶ ଵܵ is not fresh, ܣܩ௝ abandons the message.
2. Calculates ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ using its private key ௝݇.
3. Decrypts ܥଵ to get (ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁	ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ ).
4. Checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ); if they are not equal, aborts here.
5. Calculates the public key of ܯ௜ ∶ ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫.
6. Chooses a random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 .
7. Calculates ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ.
8. Calculates ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ.
9. Calculates ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ) = ܪସ((ݔଶ + ௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ) = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ).
10. Calculates ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵᇱ ൯.
11. Sends Message 2 = { ଷܶ, ܣଶ} to the client	ܯ௜.
When smart meter ܯ௜ gets the data { ଷܶ, ܣଶ}, ܯ௜ will do the following steps to authenticate this
message. 
6. ܯ௜ computes the shared key using its private key ݇௜: ݏ݇	ᇱ = 	ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ ∙ (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ) 	= ܪସ((ݔଶ +
௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ).
7. ܯ௜  checks if ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯; if they are not equal, aborts here, otherwise
calculates ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; now ܯ௜ has accepted the shared key ݏ݇	ᇱ.
8. Sends Message 3 = {ܣଷ} to ܣܩ௝.
When aggregator ܣܩ௝ g ts the data {ܣଷ}, ܣܩ௝ will check if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵᇱ || ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; if they
are equal, ܣܩ௝ , accepts t e key	ݏ݇. Now the sma t meter ܯ௜, and aggregator ܣܩ௝, have authenticated 
each other and build a shared key. The whole process is depicted in Table 8. 
Table 8. Request and authentication phase of the proposed scheme. 
Smart Meter ࡹ࢏ Aggregator ࡭ࡳ࢐ 
(݇௜, ܴ௜)	 ( ௝݇, ௝ܴ)
random numbers ݔଵ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ
ଵܶ = (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ௝ܴ	
ଵ݃ = ݃(௫భା௞೔)	
ܥଵ = ܪଶ( ଵ݃)	⨁	(ܫ݀௜, ܴ௜௡)
ܣଵ = ܪଷ൫ ଵܶห|ܫ݀௜|หܴ௜௡||ܶ ଵܵ൯
{ ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ}	 	 ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ	 	
(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁ ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ )		
checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ)	
ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫	
random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 	
ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ	
ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ	
ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ)	
ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯	
ݏ݇	ᇱ = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ)
checks if	 ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯
{ ଷܶ, ܣଶ}
ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯
{ܣଷ}	 	 checks if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯	
Both agree on session key ݏ݇
A3 = H3(sk′ | Idi||g1| T3||Idj)
{A3
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hen aggregator ܣܩ௝  receives the data { ଵܶ, ܥଵ, ܣଵ, ܶ ଵܵ } from a smart meter, ܯ௜ , ܣܩ௝  will 
conduct the following steps to authenticate the meter ܯ௜: 
1. Checks the freshness of the ܶ ଵܵ, if ܶ ଵܵ is not fresh, ܣܩ௝ abandons the message.
2. Calculates ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ using its private key ௝݇.
3. Decrypts ܥଵ to get (ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁	ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ ).
4. Checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ); if they are not equal, aborts here.
5. Calculates the public key of ܯ௜ ∶ ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫.
6. Choos s  random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 .
7. Calculates ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ.
8. Calculates ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ.
9. Calculates ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ) = ܪସ((ݔଶ + ௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ) = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ).
10. Calculates ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵᇱ ൯.
11. Sends Message 2 = { ଷܶ, ܣଶ} to the client	ܯ௜.
When smart meter ܯ௜ gets the data { ଷܶ, ܣଶ}, ܯ௜ will do the followin  s eps to authenticate this
message. 
6. ܯ௜ computes the shared key using its private key ݇௜: ݏ݇	ᇱ = 	ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ ∙ (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ) 	= ܪସ((ݔଶ +
௝݇) ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ).
7. ܯ௜  checks if ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯; if they are not equal, aborts here, otherwise
calculates ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; now ܯ௜ has accepted the shared key ݏ݇	ᇱ.
8. Sends Message 3 = {ܣଷ} to ܣܩ௝.
When aggregator ܣܩ௝ gets the data {ܣଷ}, ܣܩ௝ will check if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵᇱ || ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯; if they
are equal, ܣܩ௝ , accepts the key	ݏ݇. Now the smart meter ܯ௜, and aggregator ܣܩ௝, have authenticated 
each other and build a shared key. The whole process is depicted in Table 8. 
Table 8. Request and authentication phase of the proposed scheme. 
Smart Meter ࡹ࢏ Aggregator ࡭ࡳ࢐ 
(݇௜, ܴ௜)	 ( ௝݇, ௝ܴ)
random numbers ݔଵ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ
ଵܶ = (ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ௝ܴ	
ଵ݃ = ݃(௫భା௞೔)	
ܥଵ = ܪଶ( ଵ݃)	⨁	(ܫ݀௜, ܴ௜௡)
ଵ ଷ൫ ଵܶห|ܫ݀௜|หܴ௜௡||ܶ ଵܵ൯		
ଵ݃ᇱ = ݁( ଵܶ, ܲ)ଵ/௞ೕ	 	
(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) = ܥଵ⨁ ܪଶ( ଵ݃ᇱ )		
checks if ܣଵ = ܪଷ( ଵܶ||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܴ௜௡ᇱ ||ܶ ଵܵ)	
ܴ௜ᇱ = ܪହ(ܫ݀௜ᇱ, ܴ௜௡ᇱ ) ∙ ܴ௜௡ᇱ + ܴ௫	
random number ݔଶ
	← ܺ௤∗ோ	 	
ଶܶ = ൫ݔଶ + ௝݇൯ ∙ ௝݇ି ଵ ∙ ଵܶ	
ଷܶ = (ݔଶ + ௝݇) 	 ∙ ܴ௜ᇱ	
ݏ݇ = ܪସ( ଶܶ)	
ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯	
ݏ݇	ᇱ = ܪସ(݇௜ି ଵ(ݔଵ + ݇௜) ∙ ଷܶ)
checks if	 ܣଶ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀||ܫ݀௜||ܶ ଵܵ||݃ଵ൯
{ ଷܶ, ܣଶ}
ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇	ᇱ||ܫ݀௜||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯
{ܣଷ}	 	 checks if ܣଷ = ܪଷ൫ݏ݇||ܫ݀௜ᇱ||݃ଵ|| ଷܶ||ܫ ௝݀൯	
Both agree on session key ݏ݇
checks if A3 = H3(sk||Id′i ||g1||T3 |Idj)
Both agree on ession key sk
7. Security Analysis Using BAN Logic
A security analysis of the proposed scheme by using Burrows–Abadi–Needham logic (BAN
logic) [38] was conducted. With the help of BAN logic, we can determine whether the exchanged
information is trustworthy, and secured against eavesdropping. Now we are going to give a brief
overview of the BAN logic. First some symbols used in the BAN logic are described in the Table 9,
and some primary BAN logic postulates are given in Table 10. We suppose there are only two entities,
smart meter Mi, and aggregator AGj, in the scheme.
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Table 9. Symbols of BAN logic.
Symbol Meaning
P|≡X P believes X
P X P sees/receives X
P|∼X P once said X (or P sent X)
P|⇒X P controls X
#(X) X is fresh
P k↔Q P and Q communicate using shared key K
k→ Q K is the public key of Q
{X}k the message X is encrypted by K
{X}k−1 the message X is encrypted by private key K
Table 10. Some primary BAN logic postulates.
Name Rule
 rule P |≡ k→P, P {X}k
P X , P |≡ P
k↔Q, P {X}k
P X , P |≡
k→Q, P {X}k−1
P  X
|∼ introduction rule P |≡ k→Q, P {X}k−1
P |≡ Q | ∼ X ,
P |≡ P k↔Q, P {X}k
P |≡ Q | ∼ X
|∼ elimination rule P |≡ #(X), P |≡ Q | ∼ XP |≡ Q |≡ X
Jurisdiction or control rule P |≡Q Z=⇒ X, P |≡ Q |≡ XP |≡ X
k↔ introduction rule P |≡ # (k), P |≡ Q |≡XP |≡ P k↔Q
Elimination of multipart messages rule P |≡ Q | ∼ (X,Y)P |≡ Q | ∼ X ,
P |≡ Q |≡ (X,Y)
P |≡ Q |≡ X ,
P |≡ (X,Y)
P |≡ X ,
P(X,Y)
P X , P |≡# (X,Y)P |≡ # (X)
Freshness rule P |≡ #(X)P |≡ #(X,Y)
7.1. The Goal of the Proposed Scheme
The goals of the proposed scheme in BAN logic are depicted in the following, and these goals
could ensure Mi and AGj agree on the shared key, sk, between them.
1. Mi | ≡ Mi sk↔ AGj
2. AGj | ≡ Mi sk↔ AGj
3. Mi |≡ AGj | ≡ Mi sk↔ AGj
4. AGj |≡ Mi | ≡ Mi sk↔ AGj
7.2. Idealization of the Message
The messages of the proposed scheme, in idealized form in terms of the messages exchanged, is
given in Table 11.
Table 11. The idealized form of the messages.
Message Flow Idealization Form
1 Mi → AGj {T1, {T1, Idi, Rin, TS1}g1 , TS1}
2 AGj → Mi {T3,
{
sk, Idi, T3, Idj, TS1
}
g1
}
3 Mi → AGj {
{
sk, Idi, T3, Idj
}
g1
}
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7.3. The Initial State Assumptions
In order to prove the proposed scheme, we first have to make the following initial
state assumptions:
A1 Mi | ≡ #(TS1)
A2 AGj | ≡ #(TS1)
A3 Mi | ≡ Mi g1↔ AGj
A4 AGj | ≡ Mi g1↔ AGj
A5 Mi | ≡ AGj Z=⇒ T1
A6 AGj | ≡ Mi Z=⇒ T3
7.4. The Proof of the Proposed Scheme
7.4.1. Analysis of Message 1
1. According to Message 1, we get:
AGj  {T1, {T1, Idi, Rin, TS1}g1 , TS1} (1)
2. According to the “Elimination of multipart messages” rule and (1), we get:
AGj  {T1, Idi, Rin, TS1}g1 (2)
3. According to the “ | ∼ introduction rule”, (2), and A4, we get:
AGj |≡ Mi| ∼ {T1, Idi, Rin, TS1} (3)
4. According to the “Freshness rule”, (3), and A2, we get:
AGj | ≡ # (T1, Idi, Rin, TS1) (4)
5. According to the “Elimination of multipart messages rule”, and (4), we get:
AGj | ≡ # (T1) (5)
6. According to the “| ∼ elimination rule”, (4), and (3), we get:
AGj |≡ Mi| ≡ (T1, Idi, Rin, TS1) (6)
7. According to the “Elimination of multipart messages rule”, and (6), we get:
AGj |≡ Mi| ≡ T1 (7)
8. According to the “Jurisdiction rule”, (7), and A6, we get:
AGj | ≡ T1 (8)
9. As “x2” is a random number generated by AGj, we get:
AGj | ≡ # (x2) (9)
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10. According to “#()- promotion rule”, (5), and (9), we get:
AGj | ≡ #(sk), sk = h(
(
x2 + k j
) · k−1j · T1) (10)
11. According to the “ k↔ introduction rule”, (10) and (7), we get:
AGj | ≡ AGj sk↔ Mi (11)
7.4.2. Analysis of Message 2
12. According to Message 2, we get:
Mi  {T3, {sk, Idi, T3, Idj, TS1}g1 } (12)
13. According to the “Elimination of multipart messages rule”, and (12), we get:
Mi  {sk, Idi, T3, Idj, TS1}g1 (13)
14. According to the “ | ∼ introduction rule”, (13), and A3, we get:
Mi |≡ AGj| ∼ {sk, Idi, T3, Idj, TS1} (14)
15. According to “Freshness rule”, (14), and A1, we get:
Mi | ≡ #
(
sk, Idi, T3, Idj, TS1
)
(15)
16. According to the “Elimination of multipart messages rule”, (15), we get:
Mi | ≡ # (T3) (16)
17. According to the “| ∼ elimination rule”, (15), and (14), we get:
Mi |≡ AGj| ≡
(
sk, Idi, T3, Idj, TS1
)
(17)
18. According to the “Elimination of multipart messages rule”, and (17), we get:
Mi |≡ AGj| ≡ T3 (18)
19. According to the “Jurisdiction rule”, (18), and A5, we get:
Mi | ≡ T3 (19)
20. As “x1” is a random number generated by Mi, we get:
Mi | ≡ # (x1) (20)
21. According to the “#()- promotion rule”, (16), and (20), we get:
Mi | ≡ #(sk), sk = h
(
k−1i · (x1 + ki) · T3
)
(21)
22. According to the “ k↔ introduction rule”, (21) and (18) we get:
Mi | ≡ AGj sk↔ Mi (22)
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23. According to the “Elimination of multipart messages rule”, and (17), we get:
Mi |≡ AGj| ≡ sk (23)
7.4.3. Analysis of Message 3
24. According to Message 3 we get:
AGj  {{sk, Idi, T3, Idj}g1} (24)
25. According to the “ | ∼ introduction rule”, (24), and A4, we get:
AGj |≡ Mi| ∼ {sk, Idi, T3, Idj} (25)
26. According to “Freshness rule”, (10), and (25) we get:
AGj | ≡ #
(
sk, Idi, T3, Idj, TS1
)
(26)
27. According to the “| ∼ elimination rule”, (25), and (26), we get:
AGj |≡ Mi| ≡
(
sk, Idi, T3, Idj
)
(27)
28. According to the “Elimination of multipart messages rule”, and (27), we get:
AGj |≡ Mi| ≡ sk (28)
Now we have accomplished all the goals of our proof; based on (11), (22), (23), and (28), we can
say the proposed scheme is provably safe under BAN logic.
8. Security Analysis Using Random Oracle
In this section, a security proof of random oracle is provided, based on the model of [5,30]. In order
to simplify, it is supposed that only two entities are in FAuth: a smart meter M, and an aggregator AG.
While each entity has many instances, using Mi stands for the ith smart meter, and AGj for the
jth aggregator. ζ can be used as Mi or AGj. An instance is considered as an oracle, and a simulator is
used to answer the input message. Under this model, ζ is considered as a participant or an oracle [5].
To crack the scheme, an adversary could use a simulator to ask for the following queries:
Send (ζ, m): this oracle ζ receives a message, m, from an entity, and answers this query with the
corresponding message.
Execute (Mi, AGj): this query simulates the passive attack, and the adversary, A, can learn the
message transmitted between Mi, AGj.
ReveralSerrsion (ζ): the adversary A can learn the session specific information, and the answer of
this query doesn’t include the private key of Mi or AGj.
ReveralSk (ζ): the adversary, A, can learn the session key of the oracle ζ.
Corrupt (ζ): the adversary, A, can learn the private key of the entity ζ.
Expire (ζ): this query erases the session key of a completed session held by the oracle ζ.
Test (ζ): returns a session key or a random key, only before any of the ReveralSerrsion (ζ), ReveralSk
(ζ) and Corrupt (ζ) have been asked.
Lemma 1 (Difference Lemma). Let R1, R2 and R3 represent the events defined in some probability
distribution. If R1
∧¬R3 ⇔ R2 ∧¬R3 , we have |Pr[R1]− Pr[R2]| ≤ Pr[R3].
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Theorem 1. Let A be a t polynomial time adversary against the semantic security, and make no more than
qs send queries, qe execute queries, and qh hash queries. The advantage of A in our scheme is given by
AdvFAuth(A) ≤ O((qs+qe)
2)
(q−1) +
O(q2h)
2l
+ O(qs+qh)
2l−1 +O(qh·(AdvCDHA (t′))), where t′ = O(t + (qh + qh)·Tm),
and Tm is the time for multiplication operation in group.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we introduce four games, Gi, and the first game represents the real
attack, Succi is the event that in Game Gi the adversary correctly guesses the result of the Test (ζ).
Game G0: This game simulates the real scheme under random oracle, according to sematic
security, and it is clear that:
AdvFAuth(A) = |2Pr[Succ0]− 1|
Game G1: This game simulates all the oracles, LH stores all the answers to hash queries, if the
hash query is asked by adersary, then the answer is sotred in LA, and LP stores the transcripts of all the
messages, all oracles are demonstrated in in Tables 12 and 13, and an adversary is unable to distinguish
between the two games:
Pr[Succ0] = Pr[Succ1]
Table 12. Simulation of send queries.
Simulation of Send Queries
For a Send (Mi, init) query, the simulator does the following steps:
Selects random number x1 ← RX∗q ,
Computes T1 = (x1 + ki)·Rj, g1 = g(x1+ki), C1 = H2(g1)
⊕
(Idi, Rin), get timestamp TS1, and Calculates
A1 = H3(T1||Idi||Rin||TS1)
Returns M1 ={ T1, C1, A1, TS1} as the answer
For a Send (Mi, AGj, M1) query, the simulator does the following steps:
Computes g′1 = e(T1, P)
1/k j , and check if A1 = H3(T1||Id′i ||R′in||TS1), if they are not equal, terminates here.
Selects random number x2 ∈← RX∗q ,
Computes T2 = (x2 + kj)·k−1j ·T1, T3 = (x2 + kj) ·R′i , sk = H4(T2), and A2 = H3(sk||T3||Idj||Id′i ||TS1||g′1)
Returns M2 ={ T3, A2 } as the answer
For a Send (AGj, Mi, M2) query, the simulator does the following steps:
Computes sk′ = H4(k−1i ·(x1 + ki)·T3), and checks if A2 = H3(sk′||T3||Idj||Idi||TS1||g1), if they are not
equal, aborts here, otherwise calculates A3 = H3(sk′||Idi||g1||T3||Idj).
Returns M3 ={ A3 } as the answer
For a Send (Mi, AGj, M3) query, the simulator does the following steps:
AGj will check if A3 = H3(sk||Id′i ||g′1||T3||Idj), if they are equal, then the two parties built the shared key.
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Table 13. Simulation of other queries.
Simulation of Other Queries
For a Hash(i, s, ω) query, which i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, if the record (i, s, ω) is found in LH, return ω as result.
Otherwise, chooses a random string from {0, 1}l and add the record (i, s, ω) to LH.
If this query is asked by adversary, A, then the record is added to LA.
For a Execute(AGj, Mi) query, it proceeds with the Send queries successively, and outputs the matching
transcripts. M1 ={T1, C1, A1, TS1}, M2 ={T3, A2}, M3 ={A3}
For a Corrupt (ζ) query, the simulator returns private key owned by entity ζ.
For a RevealSession (ζ) query, the simulator returns session state information{
x1, g1 = g(x1+ki), T1 = (x1 + ki)·a·P
}
of Mi, or
{
x2, T3 = (x2 + kj)·b·P
}
for instance AGj.
For a RevealSK (ζ) query, the simulator returns session key sk, if ζ has formed an session key and the instance ζ
has not been aksed by a Test query, otherwise, null is returned.
For a Test (ζ) query, first obtains the shared key from a RevealSK (ζ) query, and then flips a coin b, if b = 1,
returns the shared key, otherwise returns an random string from {0, 1}l .
The difference lemma was imported from [39,40] for the formal security proof.
Game G2: This game simulates all the oracles in Game G1, but two kinds of collisions are trying
to be avoided here, and the results are obtained by the birthday paradox:
1. Random numbers of x1 and x2 should be different in different sessions, and the probability is
bounded by: O((qs+qe)
2)
2(q−1) .
2. The probability of a hash result collision is bounded by
O(q2h)
2l+1
, where l is the length of a result of a
hash function.
These two kinds of collisions should be avoided, so the two games differ by:
|Pr[Succ2]− Pr[Succ1]| ≤ O((qs + qe)
2)
2(q− 1) +
O
(
q2h
)
2l+1
Game G3: This game simulates the situation where an adversary may guess the result of a hash
function A1, A2 and A3 without asking the random oracle.
For a Send (Mi, AGj, M1) query, AGj has to check if M1 belongs to the transcripts, and check if
A1 ∈ LA; if either of them fails, AGj terminates the session, the probability is bounded by O(qs)2l ; for
the checking of if H2(g1) ∈ LA, and the probability is bounded by O(qh)2l , so for a Send (Mi, AGj, M1)
query, the probability is bounded by O(qs+qh)
2l
. For a Send (AGj, Mi, M2) or Send (Mi, AGj, M3) query,
the probability is bounded by O(qs+qh)
2l
, too.
This game and the previous one are indistinguishable unless the smart meter and aggregator
reject valid authentication information:
|Pr[Succ3]− Pr[Succ2]| ≤ O(qs + qh)2l
Game G4: The CDH problem is brought in this game. In order to win the game, A should ask
the query H4 and broke the CDH problem; the adversary’s goal is to compute the session key by
asking Execute (AGj, Mi) query and the corresponding hash query, and the adversary can also get the
transcripts. The proposed scheme fits the SK-security [5] in the following four cases.
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Case 1 RevealSession (Mi) and RevealSession (AGj):
Adversary can get the session state information
{
x1, g1 = g(x1+ki), T1 = (x1 + ki)·a·P
}
of Mi,
and
{
x2, T3 =
(
x2 + k j
)·b·P} for the matching instance AGj. Where a = H(Rjm||Idj)·(km + kc) + kx
and b = H(Rin||Idi)(kn + ku) + kx.
Case 2 RevealSession (Mi) and Corrupt (AGj):
Adversary can get the session state information
{
x1, g1 = g(x1+ki), T1 = (x1 + ki)·a·P
}
of Mi,
the private key
{
k j
}
for the matching instance AGj without session information.
Case 3 Corrupt (Mi) and RevealSession (AGj):
Adversary can get the private key {ki} of Mi, but could not get the session information of Mi,
and can get
{
x2, T3 =
(
x2 + k j
)·b·P} for the matching instance AGj.
Case 4 Corrupt (Mi) and Corrupt (AGj):
Adversary can get the private key {ki} of Mi, but could not get the session information, and can
get the private key
{
k j
}
for the matching instance AGj without session information, too.
However, in all the above four cases, adversary A is unable to solve the CDH problem given the
information it gets in the four cases. The shared key sk can be gotten with the probability 1qh in the list
of LA, t′ = O(t + (qh + qh)·Tm) be the running time in all, then it is not hard to get:
|Pr[Succ4]− Pr[Succ3]| ≤ O
(
qh
(
AdvCDHA
(
t′
)))
Until now, through the games and using the lemma 1, theorem 1 is proven.
9. Comparison
9.1. Computational Performance Analysis
In this section, we compared the computation cost of the proposed scheme with [4,5], and the
second scheme in [36], and we use the following symbols to stand for different time costs. In order
for comparison, we use the experimental results from [41], the same as in Odelu’s scheme, and the
results are shown in Table 14. We also “omit the modular multiplication Tm. as it requires very low
execution time than that for execution time of a modular exponentiation operation” [41]. We also
ignore the point addition and XOR operations, as the time consumption is marginal, at the same time,
we “assume Th ≈ Ts”. The final results are shown in Tables 15 and 16.
1. Texp the execution time of a modular exponentiation operation in G2
2. Tmul the execution time of a scalar multiplication operation in G1
3. Tbp the execution time of bilinear map pairing e : G1 × G1 → G2
4. Ts the execution time of a symmetric encryption/decryption
5. TH the execution time of map to point
6. Th the execution time of general one-way hash function
Table 14. Time comparison of various cryptographic operations.
Calculations Server (ms) Client (s)
Exponentiation in G2 <1 <0.1
Multiplication operation in G1 1.17 0.13
Bilinear map pairing 3.16 0.38
Map to point <1 <0.1
General hash function 0.01 0.001
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Table 15. Computation cost of different types of calculations at the authentication phase.
Schemes
Smart Meter Aggregator *
Tbp Texp Tmul Ts TH Th Tbp Texp Tmul Ts TH Th
Y. Wang et al. [36] 1 0 3 1 2 5 1 1 3 1 2 5
Odelu et al. [5] 0 1 3 0 0 6 2 2 1 0 0 6
Tsai-Lo et al. [4] 0 1 4 0 0 5 2 1 3 0 0 5
The proposed scheme 0 1 2 0 0 5 1 1 3 0 0 5
Aggregator * The smart meters are divided into different aggregation areas in the smart grid, the role of service
provider in schemes of [4,5,36] are similar to the role of the aggregator in our scheme in an aggregation area.
Table 16. Computation cost at the authentication phase.
Schemes
Smart Meter Aggregator
Total (s) Compare (s) Total (ms) Compare * (ms)
Y. Wang et al. [36] <0.976 +0.611 <8.73 +1.01
Odelu et al. [5] <0.496 +0.131 <9.72 +2
Tsai-Lo et al. [4] <0.625 +0.26 <10.88 +3.16
The proposed
scheme <0.365 0 <7.72 0
Compare * mean compare with the proposed scheme.
9.2. Communication Performance Analysis
In this section, we compared the proposed scheme’s computation cost with Tsai-Lo’s scheme [4],
Odelu’s scheme [5], and Y. Wang et al. [36]. According to Odelu et al., “the random number/nonce is
128 bits, the identity and hash output of all hash functions H1, H3, H4 and H5 (except the hash function
H2) are 160 bits each, the elements in group G1 and G2 are 320 bits and 512 bits, respectively, and the
timestamp is 32 bits” [5]. We get the following computation cost in Table 17, and for C1, its length is
calculated as the length of (Idi, Rin), which is 480 bits.
Table 17. Communication comparison.
Schemes M1 M2 M3 M4 Total Compare *
Y. Wang et al. [36] 320 320 160 160 960 −672
Odelu et al. [5] 1088 672 160 0 1920 +288
Tsai-Lo et al. [4] 608 480 320 0 1408 −224
The proposed scheme 992 480 160 0 1632 0
Compare * mean compare with the proposed scheme. M1 for message 1. M2 for message 2, M3 for message 3, M4
for message 4 only in [36].
9.3. Comparison of the Schemes
In this part, we compare the security features with the other schemes [4,5,36]. As we discussed in
Section 5, Odelu’s scheme [5] suffers from KGC impersonate attacks and KGC track attacks; in Tsai-Lo’s
scheme [4], the private key of the smart meter and service provider is also known by KGC, so their
scheme suffers from these two attacks, too. Besides, as KGC knows the private key, KGC could find
out the shared key, so KGC could launch an eavesdrop attack. The second scheme of [36] does not
have a KGC, but instead, a card maker, and the card maker knows the private key of the card owner.
Besides, according to [4], the second scheme of [36] “does not support anonymity as it uses (smart
meter) identity through its authentication process” and suffers from “unknown key share attack”.
According to [5], Tsai-Lo scheme in [4] “fails to protect the smart secret credentials when the
ephemeral secret is revealed to A (adversary).” We name this attack “session exposure attacks when
ephemeral secrets leaked”. We get Table 18 based on the security analysis in Section 5, Tables 15 and 16.
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Table 18. System comparison.
Schemes F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7
Y. Wang et al. [36] × × × - −672 bit +0.611 s +1.01 ms
Odelu et al. [5] × × √ √ +288 bit +0.131 s +2 ms
Tsai-Lo et al. [4] × × × × −224 bit +0.26 s +3.16 ms
The proposed scheme
√ √ √ √
0 0 0
F1—KGC impersonate attack, F2—KGC track attack, F3—KGC eavesdrop attack, F4—session exposure attacks if
ephemeral secrets are unexpectedly revealed under the CK–adversary, F5—comparison of communication cost,
F6—comparison of computation cost at smart meter side (s), F7—comparison of computation cost at aggregator
side (ms).
10. I3RES Project
Our work is part of the I3RES project (ICT-based intelligent management of integrated RES
for the optimal operation of smart grid), which manages the grid capabilities, supports the
deployment of services, and eases the development of user applications. The computational view
of the I3RES is defined by the development of an open platform based on standardized and
commercial off-the-shelf technologies, supporting the deployment of new services and decision-making
mechanisms (1) to support tasks associated to monitoring in the context of the medium and low voltage
network; (2) to manage the distribution of RES production in the distribution network associated to
the stakeholders; and (3) to manage and control generation–consumption balance from the consumer
point of view (DSM).
Our research group proposed a common middleware architecture for smart grids [42], which
contributed to the standardization of designing and implementation of semantic middle architecture.
It has been proven that sematic middleware architecture is a key element to create business models
where new actors can join a new scenario, and where energy access and trade are democratized and
more distributed than before. The general structure is depicted in Figure 3. The security component
is a key part of the middleware, since it provides the required security mechanisms for the different
application domains. The proposal presented in this paper was embedded within this security
component, offering the security mechanisms needed for a smart grid application in an efficient way.
Thus, it was feasible to deploy the security component in the different devices in smart grid.
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11. Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced an anonymous authentication scheme based on bilinear pairing
and the computational Diffie–Hellman problem. First, we improved the registration phase, so that
a smart meter’s private key will not be leaked to the Key Generation Center. Thus, the proposed
scheme is immune to various potential attacks launched by the Key Generation Center. Besides, we
greatly improved the efficiency of the scheme, the computation cost at both the smart meter side
and aggregator side is much lower compared to the existing schemes. We also use the BAN logic
and random oracle model to prove that the proposed scheme is secure. As data privacy of the smart
meter is becoming an urgency, in future, we want to focus on data aggregation methods in smart
grids to protect the privacy of the smart meter consumption. Finally, the proposal was fitted into the
security component of a common middleware architecture, in order to provide the required security
mechanisms for a smart grid application.
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